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Abstract Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology has been in-
creasingly integrated into numerous applications for authentication of objects
or individuals. However, because of its limited computation power, RFID tech-
nology may cause several security and privacy issues such as tracking the owner
of the tag, cloning of the tags and etc. Recently, two chaotic map-based au-
thentication protocols have been proposed for low-cost RFID tags in order
to eliminate these issues. In this paper, we give the security analysis of these
protocols and uncover their weaknesses. We prove that these protocols are vul-
nerable to tag tracing, tag impersonation and de-synchronization attacks. The
attack complexity of an adversary is polynomial and the success probability
of these attacks are substantial. Moreover, we also propose an improved RFID
authentication protocol that employs Chebyshev chaotic maps and complies
with the EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 standard. Finally, we show that our
protocol is resistant against those security issues.
Keywords RFID · Security · EPC Global · Chaotic Map
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology have been used for auto-
mated remote identification of objects or people by means of small, lightweight
and inexpensive RFID tags. By virtue of the ease of deployment and low cost,
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this technology has been broadly deployed to several daily-life applications;
for instance, in logistics, asset tracking, warehouse management, library books
check-in/check-out, medicine, embedded cards [24]. However, due to the na-
ture of the communication between readers and tags which works on insecure
wireless channel, such broad adoption of RFID technology raises important
security and privacy issues. For this reason, the authentication protocols used
in RFID technology should be seriously taken into account in order to protect
the privacy of tag owner [25].
A simple RFID system is composed of at least one reader (transceiver), sev-
eral RFID tags/labels (transponders) with limited energy consumption and a
back-end server that stores a database. Each tag is enclosed to a particular
object and has a unique identity in order to be tracked easily. Chien [12] cate-
gorizes RFID tags into four different types: ultralight, lightweight, simple, and
high cost tags. Each type has different computational capabilities. For instance,
RFID tags in ultralight category may perform only bitwise, XOR, AND and
OR operations whereas the ones in the high cost category may support public-
key cryptography. Second set of RFID components are the readers where each
reader commonly consists of a control unit, an RF module, and a coupling
element in order to query tags/labels by means of RF communication. The
last component is the back-end server which generally stores the information
about the tags in its database.
The restriction on tag’s computational capability affects on the targeted
level of security and privacy of RFID systems. On the other hand, when the
security of an RFID system is not designed carefully, the system can be vul-
nerable to a wide range of attacks such as replay attack, impersonation attack,
tracking attack and denial-of-service (DoS) attack. Namely, the more restric-
tions on the computational resources, it is more challenging to design a secure
privacy preserving authentication protocol. In the literature, these challenges
encourage researchers to propose several authentication schemes [12,27,4,9,
21,29,23,18,30]. Many of these solutions are very complex and requires com-
putations with high costs and are not compatible for ultralight RFID systems.
Besides, diverse number of ultralight authentication protocols have been re-
cently published in the literature [13,35,10,14] but most of them have security
and privacy weaknesses and do not achieve the targeted security and privacy
levels.
Moreover, considering only ultralight RFID systems, the EPCglobal Class-
1 Generation-2 (C1G2) standard has been published in order to provide a
universal model for tag and reader communications [1]. This standard has
possessed low implementation cost and high performance in order to serve
for tag singularization and chain applications. Since the standard aims only
to achieve identification performance, it lacks security and privacy features.
Even eavesdropping the messages between the reader and the tag, an adver-
sary can discover the plain messages. Notwithstanding, Cheng et al. recently
proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [11], based on
chaotic maps [33] where the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials have been
utilized. Benssalah et al. [6] proved that Cheng’s et al.’s solution has secu-
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rity weaknesses on shared secret updating and message generation. It is also
shown in [3] that this protocol is vulnerable to secret disclosure attack and de-
synchronization attack. Then, Benssalah et al. [6] also proposed an enhanced
secure RFID authentication protocol that uses Chebyshev chaotic maps as the
underlying hard problem. This protocol conforms to the EPC C1-G2 standard
with more flexibility and mobility for RFID applications. However, in [2], it is
figured out that Benssalah et al.’s protocol is also vulnerable to tracking, tag
impersonation, and de-synchronization attacks. Akgun et al. also proposed
another chaotic map-based RFID authentication protocol which is compatible
with EPC C1 G2 standard.
Our contribution: In this paper, we first define a simple generic attack that
can be applied to any RFID authentication protocol. We applied this attack to
Benssalah et al.’s authentication protocol and we observed that their protocol
does not provide resistance against tag tracking. Next, we analyzed Akgun et
al.’s protocol and proved that their protocol does not satisfy security claims
against our attack. Finally, we propose a new enhanced RFID authentication
protocol and show that this protocol eliminate those security threats.
Roadmap: The outline of the paper is given as follows. In Section 2, we give
the preliminaries about Chebyshev polynomials and the security and privacy
definitions. Section 3 describes Benssalah et al.’s protocol and then describes
Akgun et al.’s authentication protocol. Section 4 introduces our proposed pri-
vacy preserving authentication protocol. In Section 5, we first give the attacks
on Benssalah et al.’s protocol and Akgun et al.’s protocol. Then, we give the
security proof of our protocol. Section 6 gives the performance comparison
of our protocol with the existing protocols. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first review the definitions of Chebyshev polynomial and
the hard problems that employ the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials. Then,
we provide the security and privacy definitions which will be used throughout
the paper.
2.1 Chebyshev Polynomials
In this section, we borrow the definitions from [11], [36] and [37]. The formal
definition of Chebyshev chaotic maps that are proposed by Wang and Zho [32]
are given as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Chebyshev polynomials) Let x ∈ [−1, 1], and n ∈ N. Then,
the subsequent function describes a Chebyshev polynomial map Tn : R → R
of degree n:
Tn(x) = cos(nxarccosx), {x| − 1 ≤ x ≤ 1},
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and the recurrent formulas are
Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x)
where the integer n ≥ 2, T0(x) = 1, and T1(x) = x.
Using Definition 1, we have the following first few polynomials: T2(x) =
2x2 − 1, T3(x) = 4x
3 − 3x, and T4(x) = 8x
4 − 8x2 + 1. Moreover, Chebyshev
polynomials have the following semi-group and commutativity property.
Deﬁnition 2 (Semi-group property) Chebyshev polynomials have the fol-
lowing semi-group property:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Tr.s(x)
Deﬁnition 3 (Commutativity property) Chebyshev polynomials have the
following commutativity property:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x))
Based on Definition 1, the improved Chebyshev polynomials can defined as
follows. Note that this definition has been employed in the protocol designs.
Deﬁnition 4 (Improved Chebyshev Polynomials) Let x ∈ [−∞,+∞],
N be a big large number and n ≥ 2. Then, the following function defines an
improved version of Chebyshev polynomial:
Tn(x) = (2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x)) mod N
Obviously,
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x)) = Trs(x)
Hence the semigroup property still holds and the improved Chebyshev
polynomials also commute under composition.
Deﬁnition 5 (Discrete Logarithm Problem) DLP is described as follows:
Given values of x and y, find an α such that Tα(x) = y.
Deﬁnition 6 (Diﬃe–Hellman Problem) DHP is described as follows. Given
a values of x, Ts(x) and Tr(x), what is values of Trs(x) ?
2.2 The Security Definitions
RFID authentication systems are always under the threat of man-in-the-middle
attacks due to easy eavesdropping the air transmission between tags and reader.
During transmission, an adversary is able to listen, modify or block the mes-
sages being transmitted. He/she can also retransmit the messages maliciously
to interrogate the tag or the back-end server in order to impersonate the reader
or the victim tag. Several security and privacy issues and adversarial models
are addressed in [22,19,5,31,15] in details. In this paper, we consider the fol-
lowing security and privacy notions in the security analysis of authentication
protocols.
Paise et al. defines a secure authentication protocol as follows [28].
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Deﬁnition 7 (Security) An authentication protocol achieves security pro-
vided that it performs both secure tag authentication and secure reader au-
thentication. Let A be a polynomial-time bounded adversary, Ti be an uncor-
rupted alive legal tag and R be the legitimate reader. Then,
– if R identifies A as Ti on the session π with non-negligible probability
and there is not any matching conversation between Ti and π, then tag
authentication is not secure.
– if Ti identifies A on the session π with non-negligible probability and there
is not any matching conversation between R and π, then reader authenti-
cation is not secure.
Avoine defines the privacy notion of universal untraceability as follows [5].
Deﬁnition 8 (Universal untraceability) In universal untraceability, an
adversary cannot correlate two responses of a tag, where the responses are
disconnected with the help of at least a single successful authentication. The
following universal untraceability experiment is played between a challenger C
and an adversary A.
– Learning Phase: Let A communicates with two legal tags T0 and T1. A is
capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message, and stopping the
sessions between T0 and R. A can also start, monitor or stop the sessions
between T1 and R.
– Challenge Phase: Let a challenger C allow the reader to run successful
protocol transcripts with T0 and T1. Then, C randomly selects one of them
as a target tag, Tb. A communicates with Tb. Besides, A can also initiate,
monitor or stop the authentication sessions between Tb and R.
– Guessing Phase: Finally, A finishes the experimental game and produces
an output bit b′.
Avoine also introduces the privacy notion of existential untraceability as
follows [5].
Deﬁnition 9 (Existential untraceability) In existential untraceability, an
adversary cannot correlate two responses of a given tag, where these responses
are not necessarily isolated by a successful authentication. The following ex-
istential untraceability experiment is played between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
– Learning Phase: Let A communicates with two legitimate tags T0 and T1. A
is capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message or stopping the
sessions between T0 and R. A can also start, monitor or stop the sessions
between T1 and R.
– Challenge Phase: C randomly selects one of the legitimate tags as a target
tag, Tb. A communicates with Tb. A can also initiate, monitor or stop
authentication sessions between Tb and R.
– Guessing Phase: Finally, A finishes the experimental game and produces
an output bit b′.
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Furthermore, a strong adversary can corrupt Ti at time t and access to
the whole secret values of the tag. Forward untraceability is described as no
RFID tag can be traced with the help of past transactions of the tag with
the reader even though the adversary tampered the tag [27]. The notion of
forward privacy formally described in [7] as follows.
Deﬁnition 10 (Forward privacy) In forward privacy, the following experi-
ment is played between a challenger C and an strong adversary A.
– Learning Phase: Let two legitimate tags T0 and T1 communicate with A.
A is capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message, and dropping
the sessions between T0 and R. A can also start, monitor, and drop the
sessions between T1 and R.
– Challenge Phase: Let a challenger C allow the reader to run successful
protocol transcripts with T0 and T1. C randomly selects one of them as a
target tag, Tb. A communicates with Tb. A can initiate, monitor, and drop
authentication sessions between Tb and R. A has also access to authenti-
cation outcomes and internal state of Tb.
– Guessing Phase: Finally, A finishes the experimental game and produces
an output bit b′.
3 Previous Art on Chaotic Map Based Authentication Protocol
In this section, we give the detailed descriptions of two RFID authentication
protocols, which utilize the chaotic maps as the underlying hard problem. The
first protocol is Benssalah et al.’s authentication protocol. The latter one is
Akgun et al.’s authentication protocol which is the improved version of the
former one. Both protocols essentially uses cryptographic primitives such as
chaotic maps, hash function and xor operation at the reader side but uses only
chaotic map and xor in the tag side.
3.1 Benssalah et al.’s Authentication Protocol
Benssalah et al. [6] showed some weaknesses of the protocol of Cheng et al.
[11] that utilizes the chaotic maps. Then, they suggested an improved version
of the protocol and which also employs the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials.
Considering the computational requirement, the tags need four chaotic map
operations and one pseudo-random number generation. The authors claimed
that their authentication scheme is secure against replay, impersonation and
denial-of-service attacks. Their protocol also offers mobility and mutual au-
thentication.
3.1.1 Notation
Table 1 provides the notations used throughout the authentication scheme.
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Table 1 The following notations are used in [6]
Notation Deﬁnition
ID ID value of a tag
h(.), H(.) Hash functions
H(ID) Hash of an identity (ID)
xnew The newly generated session key
xold The old session key





Benssalah et al.’s RFID authentication scheme is depicted in Figure 1. The
scheme consists of two stages: initialization and authentication.
The Initialization Stage: For each tag in the system, the server/owner first
picks a random secret key x. Next, the server records the credentials of each tag
in its own database, which has the following form: [xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID,H(ID)]
where ID is the tag’s identity and cold/cnew represents the old and new in-
dex values of the tag in the database, respectively. Each tag stores a data
in the form of [x, ci, ID,H(ID)] in its non-volatile memory. RID denotes
an identifier of a reader. The initial values are set as cnew ← cold ← 0 and
xnew ← xold ← x.
The Authentication Stage: Authentication is carried out by performing the
following steps.




2. Once received r, the tag picks another random number tǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and
computesM1 ← h(ID)⊕((r⊕t)||(t⊕ID))⊕t,M2 ← Tr·t(x) andM3 ← x⊕t.
Then, the tag sends the quadruple (ci,M1,M2,M3) to the reader.
3. Upon receiving (ci,M1,M2,M3), the reader gets a time-stamp T and com-
putes V ← H(RID⊕ r⊕T ). Next, it sends (r, V, T, ci,M1,M2,M3) to the
server.
4. The server verifies the validity of V . If V is valid, the server executes the
following transactions depending on the value of ci.
(a) If ci is equal to 0:
– The server scans the whole database and finds the matched records.
For each record in the database, the server computes Told ← Tr·(M3⊕xold)(xold)
and Tnew ← Tr·(M3⊕xold)(xnew). If M2 is equal to either Told or
Tnew, the server finds the correct match in the database. Server
sets x to xold or xnew.
– The server also checks the validity of the message M1. If M1 is not
a valid message, it rejects the tag.
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(b) If ci is not equal to 0:
– ci is the database index of the current tag. The server gets the
record where ci matches with either cold or cnew. Then, it updates
x← xold or x← xnew.
– The validity of both M1 and M2 are checked by the server . If one
of them is invalid, the tag would be rejected.
(c) The server picks another random number sǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and computes
Hinfo ← h(data ⊕ r), info ← RID ⊕ data, M4 ← h(ID) ⊕ s ⊕ r,
M5 ← Ts·t(x). Then, it sends (info,Hinfo,M4,M5) to the reader.
(d) The server also executes xold ← xnew, cold ← cnew, xnew ← xnew ⊕
Tt||s(xnew) and cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew) for key and index updating.
5. The reader verifies that Hinfo is valid. If Hinfo is valid, the reader sends
(M4, M5) to the tag.
6. The tag recovers s from M4 by computing s← h(ID)⊕ r ⊕M4.
7. The tag also verifies the validity of M5. If M5 is valid, the tag executes the
following key and index updates (x← x⊕ Tt||s(x), ci ← Ts⊕t(x)).
3.1.3 Security Analysis of The Protocol
In this protocol, we first give a generic attack that can be applied to any
authentication protocol. Then, we show the security issues of this protocol
against our attack.
Let A be an active adversary who can initiate a protocol with a tag or
reader, stop the protocol between a tag and reader, modify the responses from
a tag or reader.
Deﬁnition 11 (Generic Attack) Let T be the target tag and R be the
legal reader. Our attack consists of two phases.
1. In the first phase,Amodifies the first message ofR. Next, the tag computes
the response and sends it to R.
2. In the second phase, R generates its own messages and sends them to the
server. However, A updates the response of the R.
Impersonation Attack: We utilize our generic attack in order to impersonate
a victim tag T0 with another legal tag Ti. In this attack, the reader would
authenticate Tj but the tag in front of R would be Ti. The attack steps are
carried out as follows.
– R generates a random number r and sends it to the tag Ti but during the
transmission A corrupts the message and set r ← 0.
– Ti also generates another random number t and computes M1, M2, and
M3. Note that since r = 0, M2 = T0.t(x) = 1. Ti sends the quadruple (M1,
M2,M3, ci) to R.
– After receiving the quadruple, R generates a time-stamp T and computes
V = H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T ). Next, it dispatches the quadruple along with r, T
and V to the server.
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Backend Server RFID Reader Tagi
[xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID, H(ID)] [ID, H(ID), x, ci]




Pick a random t ∈R {0, 1}
l
M1 ←H(ID)⊕
((r ⊕ t)||(t⊕ ID))⊕ t
M2 ← Tr·t(x), M3 ← x⊕ t
ci, M1, M2, M3
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generate a timestamp T
V ← H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T )
r, V, T, ci, M1, M2, M3
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick a random s ∈R {0, 1}
l
M4 ← h(ID)⊕ s⊕ r
M5 ← Ts·t(x)
Hinfo ← H(data⊕ r)
info← RID ⊕ data






xold ← xnew s← H(ID)⊕ r ⊕M4
xnew ← xnew⊕Ts||t(xnew) if M5 = Ts·t(x)
cold ← cnew x← x⊕ Tt||s(x)
cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew) ci ← Ts⊕t(x)
Fig. 1 The protocol of Benssalah et al.
– During the transmission A sets c as 0, T = T ⊕ r and r ← 0.
– The server first validates the correctness of V by computing V ′ = H(RID⊕
r⊕T ). This validation is passed because RID⊕ 0⊕T ⊕ r ← RID⊕T ⊕ r.
Since ci = 0, the server will do full search on the database. For the first
element of database, the server computes Told ← T(M3⊕xold).r(xold) and
Tnew ← T(M3⊕xnew).r(xnew). Note that both Told and Tnew will be equal
to 1 because r ← 0 and the property of Chebyshev polynomial T0(x)→ 1.
Now, the server would see that Told is equal to M2. The server would also
try to verify the correctness of the M1 but even the server finds that M1
is not correct, the protocol is not aborted because this case is not really
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considered in the protocol. Then, the server computes M3 and M4 and
sends them to R. Finally, the server updates xold, xnew, cold and cnew.
After this attack, the reader authenticates first entry of the database but
the reader interacts with different tag Ti.
Desynchronization Attack: The protocol is vulnerable to desynchronization
attack. When two subsequent impersonation attacks are mounted, xold and
xnew values are both updated incorrectly. This causes that the first tag in the
database can no longer be authenticated by a legal reader.
3.2 Akgun et al.’s Authentication Protocol
Akgun et al. [2] found some weaknesses on the protocol of Benssalah et al.
[6] and proposed an improved version of the protocol.
3.2.1 Protocol Description
Similar to Benssalah et al. , the scheme of Akgun et al.’s also consists of two
stages: initialization and authentication. Figure 2 illustrates the authentication
scheme of Akgun et al. .
The Initialization Stage: The server picks a random and different secret
key for each tag. Then, the server saves the credentials of each tag in its own
database, which has the form of [xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID] where cold/cnew
represents database index and ID is the identifier of a tag. Each tag stores
[x, ci, ID] values in its non-volatile memory. RID denotes the identifier of a
reader. The initial values of the database indexes and session secrets are set
as cnew ← cold ← 0 and xnew ← xold ← x.
The Authentication Stage:
1. First of all, a legitimate RFID reader picks a random number rǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and broadcasts it.
2. Once received r, the tag picks another random number tǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and
calculates M1 ← Tt·r(x ⊕ r) and M2 ← x ⊕ t and forwards the triple
messages (ci,M1,M2) to the reader.
3. Next, the reader gets a time-stamp T , calculates V ← H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T )
and sends back (r, ci, V, T,M1,M2) to the server.
4. Upon receiving (r, ci, V, T,M1,M2), the validity of V is first done. If V is
valid, the server executes the subsequent transactions:
(a) If ci is equal to 0:
– The server scans whole database and searches a match record. For
each entry, the server computes Told ← Tr·(M2⊕xold)(xold ⊕ r) and
Tnew ← Tr·(M2⊕xold)(xnew ⊕ r). If M1 is equal to Told or Tnew, the
server finds the correct record in the database and then, the server
sets x← xold or x← xnew according to value of Told or Tnew.
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Backend Server RFID Reader Tagi
[xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID] [x, ci, ID]
Pick a random r ∈ {0, 1}l
r
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Pick a random t ∈R {0, 1}
l
M1 ← Tt·r(x⊕ r)
M2 ← x⊕ t
ci, M1, M2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generate a timestamp T
V ← H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T )
r, ci, V, T, M1, M2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick a random s ∈R {0, 1}
l
M3 ← s⊕ r ⊕ ID
M4 ← Tt·s(s⊕ x)
Hinfo ← h(r ⊕ data)
info← data⊕RID
info, Hinfo, M3, M4
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check if
Hinfo = h(r ⊕ info⊕RID)
M3, M4
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
xold ← xnew s← ID ⊕ r ⊕M3
xnew ← Ts||t(xnew) if M4 = Tt·s(x⊕ s)
cold ← cnew x← Tt||s(x)
cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew) ci ← Ts⊕t(x)
Fig. 2 The protocol of Akgun et al.
(b) If ci is not equal to 0,
– ci is the current database index. The server gets the database record
where ci matches with cold or cnew and executes x ← xold or x ←
xnew.
– The server checks the validity of M1. If it is invalid, the tag would
be rejected.
(c) The server picks another random number sǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and computes
info← RID ⊕ data, Hinfo ← H(data⊕ r), M3 ← s⊕ r ⊕ ID, M4 ←
Tt·s(x⊕ s). Then, the server sends the quadruple (info,Hinfo,M3,M4)
to the reader.
(d) Next, the server executes cold ← cnew, xold ← xnew, cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew)
and xnew ← Tt||s(xnew) for index and key updating.
5. The reader verifies the validity of Hinfo. If Hinfo is valid, the reader sends
(M3,M4) to the tag.
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6. The tag recovers s from M3 by executing s← ID ⊕ r ⊕M3.
7. The tag verifies checks the validity of M4. If M4 is valid, the tag executes
x← Tt||s(x) and ci ← Ts⊕t(x) to update the key and the index.
3.2.2 The security analysis of the protocol
In this section, we provide two impersonation attacks and a desyncronization
attack that can be practically mounted to the protocol of Akgun et al. . In the
first impersonation attack, the adversary actively monitors and modifies the
messages between a victim tag and a legal reader, and the messages between
the reader and the server. In the second impersonation attack, no tag is needed
in order to impersonate the tag whose identity is stored in the first entry of
the database. The desyncronization attack can applied to this protocol using
the first impersonation attack.
Impersonation Tag-I: Our generic attack can be applied to this protocol in
order to impersonate a victim tag T0 with another legal tag Ti. In this attack,
the reader R authenticates Tj but the tag in front of R would be Ti. The
attack is performed as follows.
– R generates a random number r and sends it to the tag Ti but during the
transmission A corrupts the message and set r ← 0.
– Ti also generates another random number t and computes M1 and M2.
Note that since r = 0, M2 = T0.t(x ⊕ t) = 1. Ti sends the triple (M1, M2,
ci) to R.
– After the receiving the triple, R generates a timestamp T and computes
V ← H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T ) and sends the triple along with r, T and V to the
server.
– During the transmission A sets c← 0, T ← T ⊕ r and r ← 0.
– The server first validates the correctness of V by comparing it to H(RID⊕
r⊕ T ). This validation is passed because RID⊕ 0⊕ T ⊕ r = RID⊕ T ⊕ r.
Since ci = 0, the server will perform a full search on the database. For the
first element in the database, the server computes Told ← T(M2⊕xold).r(xold)
and Tnew ← T(M2⊕xnew).r(xnew). Note that both Told and Tnew will be
equal to 1 because of r = 0 and the property of Chebyshev polynomial
T0(x) = 1. Now, the server would see that Told is equal to M1. Then,
the server computes M3 and M4 and sends them to R. Finally, the server
updates xold, xnew, cold and cnew.
After this attack, the reader authenticates the first entry in the database
but the reader interacts with a different tag Ti.
Impersonation Tag-II: In this attack, there is no need to interact with any tag
in order to impersonate the first tag in the database of the server. The attack
works as follows.
1. The reader sends a random r to A who try to impersonate T0.
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2. A generates two random numbers t and x. Then, it sets ci ← 0, M1 ← 1
and M2 ← x⊕ t and sends the triple (M1, M2, ci) to the reader.
3. Upon receiving the triple, R generates a timestamp T and computes V ←
H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T ). Next, it sends the triple along with r, T and V to the
server.
4. During the transmission betweenR and the server, A sets c← 0, T ← T⊕r
and r ← 0.
5. The server first validates the correctness of V by comparing it to H(RID⊕
r⊕ T ). This validation is passed because RID⊕ 0⊕ T ⊕ r = RID⊕ T ⊕ r.
Since ci = 0, the server will perform a full search on the database. For the
first element of database, the server computes Told ← T(M2⊕xold).r(xold)
and Tnew ← T(M2⊕xnew).r(xnew). Note that both Told and Tnew will be
equal to 1 since r = 0 and due to the property of Chebyshev polynomials
T0(x) = 1. Now, the server would see that Told is equal to M1. Then,
the server computes M3 and M4 and sends them to R. Finally, the server
updates xold, xnew, cold and cnew.
Desyncronization attack: The protocol is vulnerable to desynchronization
attack. When two subsequent impersonation attacks are mounted, xold and
xnew are both updated incorrectly. This results in that the first tag in the
database can no longer be authenticated by a legal reader.
4 Our Enhanced Protocol
In this section, we suggest another enhanced chaotic map-based RFID authen-
tication protocol which conforms to EPCGlobal G2 C1 standard. Our protocol
utilizes pseudo-random number generation, xor operation and algebraic prop-
erties of Chebyshev polynomials.
4.1 Protocol description
Figure 3 depicts our enhanced authentication protocol. The protocol consists
of two phases: initialization and authentication.
4.1.1 The Initialization step
For each tag, the server generates a random secret key x. Next, the server
saves the credentials of each tag in its own database that has the form of
[xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID] where cold/cnew represent database index values and
ID is the identifier of a tag. Each tag stores [x, ci, ID] values in its non-
volatile memory. RID denotes identifier of a reader. The initial values are set
as cnew ← cold ← 0 and xnew ← xold ← x.
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Backend Server RFID Reader Tagi
[xold, cold, xnew, cnew, ID]
[x, ci, ID]





t ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ
M1 ← Tx.t(x⊕ r)
M2 ← x⊕ t
ci, M1, M2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generate a time-stamp T
V ← H(r, T, RID)
ci, r, V, T, M1, M2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick a random
s ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ
M3 ← TID(r ⊕ t)⊕ s
M4 ← Tt·s(x⊕ s)
Hinfo ← H(r ⊕ data)
info← data⊕RID
info, Hinfo, M3, M4
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check if
Hinfo = H(info⊕ r ⊕RID)
M3, M4
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
xold ← xnew s←M3 ⊕ TID(r ⊕ t)
xnew ← Ts||t(xnew) if M4 = Tt·s(x⊕ s)
cold ← cnew x← Ts||t(x)
cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew) ci ← Ts⊕t(x)
Fig. 3 Our proposed RFID authentication protocol.
4.1.2 The Authentication step
The authentication of a tag is carried out by performing the following steps;




2. Once received r, the tag picks another random number tǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and sets
M1 ← Tx.t(x⊕ r) and M2 ← x⊕ t. Next it sends the triple (M1,M2, ci) to
the reader.
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3. After receiving (M1,M2, ci), the reader generates a time-stamp T and com-
putes V ← H(RID, r, T ). Next, it sends (M1,M2, ci, r, V, T ) to the server.
4. The server performs validity check on V . If it is valid, the server executes
the following transactions:
(a) If ci is equal to 0:
– The server scans the whole database and searches for a match. For
each record, the server computes Told ← T(xold.(M2⊕xold)(xold ⊕ r)
and Tnew ← T(xnew.(M2⊕xnew))(xnew ⊕ r). If M1 is equal to Told or
Tnew, the server finds the corresponding records in the database.
The server sets either x← xold or x← xnew according to the value
of M1.
(b) If ci is not equal to 0:
– ci is the database index of the current tag. The server gets the
database record where ci matches with cold or cnew and updates
x← xold or x← xnew.
– The server checks the validity of M1. If it is invalid, the server
rejects the tag.
(c) The server picks another random number sǫR {0, 1}
ℓ
and computes
info← RID ⊕ data, Hinfo ← H(r ⊕ data), M3 ← TID(r ⊕ t)⊕ s and
M4 ← Tt·s(x⊕ s). Next, it sends (info,Hinfo,M3,M4) to the reader.
(d) The server finally executes xold ← xnew, cold ← cnew, xnew ← Tt||s(xnew),
and cnew ← Ts⊕t(xnew) for key updating.
5. The reader verifies that Hinfo is valid. If Hinfo is valid, it sends the tuple
(M3,M4) to the tag.
6. The tag recovers s from M3 by computing s←M3 ⊕ TID(r ⊕ t).
7. The tag verifies the validity of M4. If M4 is valid, the tag executes ci ←
Ts⊕t(x) and x← Ts||t(x) to update the index and the key, respectively.
4.2 Security Analysis of the Protocol
In this section, according to the security definitions described in Section 2.2, we
provide the security analysis of our enhanced protocol. We prove our proposed
protocol satisfies the security and privacy expectations.
Lemma 1 Let T denote a victim legitimate tag in the RFID system. Then,
without corrupting T , the secret values of T cannot be computationally recov-
ered.
Proof For each query, T answer back with ci,M1 = Tx·t(x⊕r) andM2 = x⊕t
values. Note that the value of t is randomly refreshed and this is directly used
in the computation of M1 and M2. The computational adversary A cannot
recover the values of t fromM1 andM2 with non-negligible probability because
of the fact that it is safeguarded by Chebyshev chaotic map hard problems
(Definition 5 and Definition 6). On the other hand, the reader sends responses
to the tag with M3 = TID(r ⊕ t) ⊕ s and M4 = Ts·t(x ⊕ s). M3 and M4
messages are randomized by s, which is randomly generated by the server and
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this value is unknown to A. Similarly, A cannot recover s from M3 and M4
since the Chebyshev chaotic map hard problems (Definition 5 and Definition 6)
safeguard s. Moreover, ci is computed for database index and constructed by
the previous x, s and t values using Chebyshev chaotic map hard problems. A
still cannot retrieve x, s or t from ci because of the Chebyshev chaotic map
hardness property. Besides x and ci values are updated after each successful
session. Hence the old and new values of the x and ci cannot be correlated
with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 1 Let ℓ denotes the security parameter of the RFID system. Then,
our protocol achieves secure tag authentication given that T.(.) is defined as a
Chebyshev chaotic map with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Proof We assume that there is a polynomial-time bounded adversary A that
impersonates a tag Ti to cheat a legal reader R with a non-negligible probabil-
ity. Having received a random nonce r, A should compute M1 = Txj⊕t(x
j⊕r),
M2 = x
j ⊕ t, and ci = ci. A has a chance to use the previously recorded
responses of Ti. For instance, during the protocol session πj , A records the






4 ) between R and Ti. A starts a new proto-
col session πj+1 with R. R first sends r
j+1 to A. A chooses a new random
tj+1 and has to compute the responses M j+11 = Txj+1⊕tj+1(x




j+1⊕ tj+1. A needs the value of xj+1 in order to compute M j+11 and
M
j+1
2 . However, x
j+1 can be computed by using tj , sj and xj values but these
values are also protected by the Chebyshev chaotic map because of Definition 5
and Definition 6. Therefore, A could use the previous response messages with
a negligible probability of 21−ℓ.
Theorem 2 Let ℓ denote the security parameter of the RFID system. Then,
our protocol achieves secure reader authentication given that T.(.) is defined
as a Chebyshev chaotic map with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Proof We assume that there is a polynomial-time bounded adversary A that
impersonates a legal reader R to cheat a tag Ti with a non-negligible probabil-
ity. Having received M1, M2 and ci, A needs to compute M3 = TID(r⊕ t)⊕ s
and M4 ← Ts·t(x ⊕ s). A has a chance to use previously recorded responses
of R. For instance, during the protocol session πj , A records the messages











4 . Hence Ti could not update the values of x
j and cji but the server did.
Now, A starts a new protocol session πj+1 with Ti. A first sends r
j to Ti and
the tag chooses a new random tj+1 and sends back the responses M j+11 =
Txj⊕tj+1(x
j ⊕ rj) and M j+12 = x
j ⊕ tj+1. A needs the values of tj+1 and xj
in order to compute M j+13 and M
j+1
4 . However, t
j+1 and xj are protected by
Chebyshev chaotic map because of Definition 5 and Definition 6. So A could
use the previous response messages with negligible probability of 21−ℓ.
Theorem 3 Our proposed protocol achieves universal untraceability given that
T.(.) is an enhanced Chebyshev polynomial with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
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Proof Let A denote the adversary who achieves the experiment of universal
untraceability with non-negligible probability. Let T0 and T1 be the victim tags
and R denote the legitimate reader.
– Throughout the learning phase, A executes, eavesdrops, and drops the
authentication sessions between T0 and R and the sessions between T1 and
R.
– During the challenge phase, let R perform successful authentications with
T0 and T1, so both T0 and T1 updates their own secrets. After that, A
executes, eavesdrops, and breaks authentication sessions between Tb and
R where b is chosen randomly.
– In the guess phase, A has to guess the value of b. A tries to correlate the
responses of the tags in the learning phase and the responses of the Tb in
the challenge phase. Since the secret values of Tb are updated using the help
of the Chebyshev chaotic map with Definition 5 and Definition 6, at least
one successful authentication yields the responses to be indistinguishable.
Therefore, A cannot correlate these responses.
Theorem 4 Our enhanced protocol does not achieve existential untraceability.
Proof Let A be an adversary that executes two different successful authenti-
cation runs (say π1 and π2) with a victim tag T0. It is clearly seen that if a
legitimate reader does not execute any successful authentication with T0 be-
tween π1 and π2, the database index ci in these runs will be the same. This
information gives A to distinguish these two runs. Hence, our protocol does
not satisfy existential untraceability.
Theorem 5 Our protocol satisfies forward privacy given that T.(.) is an en-
hanced Chebyshev polynomial with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Proof Let A denote the adversary who achieves the experiment of forward
privacy with a non-negligible probability. Let T0 and T1 be the victim tags
and R denote the legitimate reader.
– Throughout the learning phase, A executes, eavesdrops, and drops the
authentication sessions between T0 and R and the sessions between T1 and
R.
– During the challenge phase, let R perform successful authentications with
T0 and T1, so both T0 and T1 updates their own secrets. After that, A
executes, eavesdrops, and breaks authentication sessions between Tb and R
where b is chosen randomly. Also, The internal state of the tag Tb is given to
A. A learns ID, xj+1, cj+1b such that x
j+1 = Tsj ||tj (x
j), cj+1b = Tsj⊕tj (x
j).
– In the guess phase, A has to predict the correct value of b. A tries to find
out the correlation between the authentication messages eavesdropped in
the learning phase and the current internal state of Tb. Assume that A
recorded an authentication run that occurred during the challenge phase.
After the challenge phase, the secret key and index values of Tb are updated.
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The recorded authentication messages are as follows:
M
j
1 = Txj ·tj (x








j ⊕ tj)⊕ sj
M
j






Since ID is fixed through the life of Ti, M
j
3 would better for A to find a
correlation. A has to know tj and s values. In order to recover tj value,
A should know the secret xj . Using xj+1 which is given to A in the learn-
ing phase, it is not computationally feasible to extract xj because of the
property of Chebyshev chaotic map. Moreover, s value cannot be retrieved
from M j4 due to hardness of Chebyshev chaotic map problems (see Defini-
tions 5 and 6). As a result, A achieves forward privacy experiment with a
negligible probability.
4.3 Performance Comparisons
Table 2 Security and privacy comparison of the protocols.
Security features [35] [36] [11] [6] [3]
Improved
Protocol
Mutual authentication ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Mobility ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔
Resistance to server
impersonation attack
✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
Resistance to tag
impersonation attack
✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Resistance to secret
disclosure attacks
✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
Resistance to
replay attacks
✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
Resistance to de-
synchronization attacks
✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Backward untraceability ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
Universal untraceability ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
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Table 3 Performance comparison of the protocols.
Features [35] [36] [11] [6] [3]
Improved
Protocol
Communication rounds 5 5 5 5 5 5
Communication cost 4M 4M 3M 4M 3M 3M
Storage overhead 4M 4M 3M 4M 3M 3M
Back-end server
computation
3SRS 1R+4P 1R+2T 1R+4T 1R+4T+2H 1R+5T+2H
Reader computation 1R 1R+1H 1R 1R+2H 1R+2H 1R+2H
Tag computation 3S+4H+1R 1R+6P 1R+4T 1R+4T 1R+4T 1R+5T
Key search complexity O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Crypto primitives X,P X,P T,X,C T,X,C T,X,C T,X,C
RFID tags are resource constrained devices, i.e., they have low computa-
tion powers and small storage capacities. Consequently, RFID protocols em-
ploy resource friendly cryptographic mechanisms. In our protocol, tags gener-
ate pseudo random numbers, perform xor operations, concatenate bit strings
and operate on Chebyshev chaotic maps.
Chebyshev polynomials are employed in various cryptographic schemes in-
cluding key agreement protocols [26,34], password-based authentication schemes
[16,20], public key encryption schemes [37,8], and RFID authentication pro-
tocols [11,6,3]. The implementation of Chebyshev polynomials uses small re-
sources so that smart cards and RFID tags can utilize them.
From performance point of view, the most critical operation in our scheme
is the semi-group property of enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps, since other
operations performed by tag are insignificant such as xor operation and con-
catenation of bit strings. The number of steps required for the computation of
Tn(x) grows linearly with n which is later reduced to logarithmic complexity
in [17] by making the following observation:
T2n(x) = T2(Tn(x)) (2)
T2n+1(x) = 2.Tn+1(x).Tn(x)− x (3)
A number of methods have been proposed to reduce the required com-
putation time of Tn(x) in [32]. Moreover, the trigonometric equality Tn(x) =
cos(n.arccos(x)) allows us to compute Chebyshev polynomials more efficiently
and implement them on resource constrained devices such as RFID tags.
Security characteristics of our improved protocol is compared with the
existing protocols and the findings are summarized in Table 2. Our improved
protocol supports all the desired features which are expected from an RFID
authentication protocol. We would provide existential untraceability feature
in our protocol by avoiding the ci variable however, this would cause each
authentication request to require a search operation with linear complexity.
Let C denote concatenation, H denote hash function, M denote message
length, P denote pseudo-random number generation, R denote random number
20 Süleyman Kardaş, Ziya Alper Genç
generation, S denote modular squaring, SRS denote square root solving, T
denote Chebyshev polynomials and X denote xor operation. We compare the
computational complexity of our protocol with previous works in Table 3. The
result shows that, our protocol does not exceed the required computation
power of previous works though it provides a better security.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the security and privacy of two recently pub-
lished RFID authentication protocols. The former protocol employs Cheby-
shev polynomials and we proved that this protocol does not provide resistance
against tag impersonation, tracking, and de-synchronization attacks. On the
other hand, the latter protocol is the enhanced version of the first one. Notwith-
standing the proposed improvements, the latter protocol also contains basic
security weaknesses and it is not resistant against tag impersonation, and
de-synchronization attacks. Moreover, we offered an improved RFID authenti-
cation protocol that employs chaotic maps for low-cost devices. Our protocol
complies with the EPC C1-G2 standard and achieves the expected security
and privacy requirements.
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